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Gambling and the Risk Society: The Liberalisation and
Legitimation Crisis of Gambling in the Netherlands
SYTZE KINGMA
Free University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT The liberalisation of gambling is associated with gambling addiction; thus gambling
markets can be interpreted in line with Ulrich Beck’s thesis of the ‘risk society’. This article
analyses the dynamics of the risk society in the case of Dutch gambling markets. It is argued that
a paradigm shift relative to gambling policy—from the ‘alibi model’ to the ‘risk model’—has
created a legitimation crisis of gambling policy in the Netherlands. This crisis is characterised by
a chain of small but significant adjustments to market forces, justified by changing and often
contradictory policy motives. Although gambling markets increasingly tend to be regulated with
reference to risks, what exactly constitutes these risks is in many cases controversial. This article
highlights the ambiguous nature of the risk society and commercialised gambling.
Introduction
During the 1980s and 1990s gambling markets in many countries have been
liberalised and expanded significantly. In the Netherlands this included the
legalisation of slot machines (1986), the expansion of the number of legal casinos
to 12, the introduction of the Postcode Lottery (1989) and the denationalisation
of the State Lottery (1992). The visibility of gambling increased by sensational
advertising, by the establishment of luxurious amusement arcades and casinos at
premium locations, and by spectacular gaming shows on television. The returns
and profits of most gambling markets grew enormously.
This expansion wave is a virtually global phenomenon (Eadington and Cor-
nelius, 1997; McMillen, 1996). National governments increasingly treat gambling
as a free market in the entertainment economy. The reverse side of this
development is that in the same period the problematic of gambling addiction
increased as well. In the Netherlands in the early 1990s the social unrest over
gambling addiction increased, notably through media attention. Initially this
concern was mainly directed at slot machines but soon this concern spread to
almost the entire field of gambling. Treatment centres for addiction developed
specific information campaigns and treatment programs for problem gamblers;
social-scientific research was conducted in order to map the prevalence of
gambling addiction (Kingma, 1993; Koeter, 1996); and within national gambling
policy the turmoil over gambling addiction, and the crime associated with this,
was translated into proposals to curb gambling markets (Ministry of Justice,
1995).
Gambling markets appear to fit with what Ulrich Beck (1992) calls the risk
society. In his theory, Beck presents an interpretation of postmodern societies.
He suggests a new phase of modernisation, in which societies themselves
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explicitly reckon with the (unintended) consequences of modernisation pro-
cesses. In the debates around these consequences the ‘risk society’ has become
a central theme of present-day sociology (Adam et al., 1999; Beck, 1999; Giddens,
1990; Van Loon, 2002). In these debates, risks regarding safety, environment or
health, are perceived as inherent to modern societies. A reflexive attitude
towards risks and the systematic incorporation of risks in organisations and life
worlds are argued to signal a new phase of development. From this point of
view, gambling can easily be typified as an entertainment market that is
compatible with the risk society. An increase in the risk of gambling addiction
seems to be a logical consequence of the liberalisation and expansion of gam-
bling markets.
The Risk Model
In this article I want to argue that this developmental logic is better treated as
a result of the analysis than as a starting point. At the start of gambling
liberalisation it was not at all clear that this could bring a problem of gambling
addiction. Nor was the liberalisation of gambling itself self-evident. Various
strategies of regulation apply to gambling markets. These markets cannot be
pictured as uniform and unambiguous. The liberalisation and expansion of
gambling in the Netherlands did not manifest itself simultaneously or to the
same extent for all gambling games. For example, revenues of totes and lotteries
which experienced a great rise in the 1960s and 1970s, stagnated or even fell in
the 1980s. It was mostly the casinos and slot machines that expanded
significantly. This selective expansion changed the structure and composition of
the legal gambling market. The emphasis shifted from instrumental and passive
games (such as lotteries) to more expressive and active types (such as interactive
slot games), in policy terms referred to as ‘low-risk’ versus ‘high-risk’ gambling.1
After 1988 this division was systematically included in Dutch gambling policy,
which entails a relatively strict treatment of high-risk gambling.
The dynamics behind the risks of gambling are difficult to understand without
a closer examination of the actors and organisations that render a market its
high-risk or low-risk status.2 In this case, liberalisation and addiction are
considered social constructions (Bergler, 1966; Douglas, 1970), where in specific
cases qualifications of ‘safe’ or ‘hazardous’ social activities are the outcome of
negotiations and dispute between diverging parties linking specific definitions of
what they feel is acceptable to their power relations. Risk assessment of gam-
bling by governments are influenced by the subjective and political appreciation
of gambling, and also by changes in gambling formulas, distribution and
marketing or measures to control the market. The gambling formula, or its modus
operandi is one of the aspects considered relevant for labelling a game as high
risk. This became clear, for instance, when hybrid gambling games were intro-
duced at a time when the markets for instrumental games stagnated and that of
expressive gambling expanded. Providers added expressive elements to instru-
mental lotteries, as is the case with spectacular game shows on television and
with scratch cards. Scratch cards were considered risky by most, but not all,
political parties.
Although gambling addiction primarily has been perceived to be of a
psychological nature, this addiction is also a social phenomenon and highly
relevant to the structure of gambling development. That is, we can not treat this
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addiction as a psychological issue but, as Latour (1997) does, with techno-
science, we concentrate on the social strategies behind the addiction arguments
and the social consequences that follow. In this light, it does not per se interest
me if gambling leads to addiction or not. I would like to focus on processes of
market development and market control, processes that run different courses
and have different outcomes for various gambling markets. Subsequently, I will
not a priori regard certain games as high risk or low risk, as it is precisely this
distinction that needs explanation. A focus on addiction is also essential to
understand the construction of acceptable and moderate gambling. We should
not only wonder why gambling leads to addiction but also wonder why in many
cases the risk of gambling addiction is considered comparatively low. In this
way, addiction will cease to be merely a side issue of Dutch gambling markets,
as it is often made out to be. In short, this article will be about the dynamics of
risk assessment and the contribution of gambling to the risk society.
The dynamics of risk assessment take shape in the context of a specific regime
of regulation for gambling. In The Gambling Complex (Kingma, 2002), which is
based on detailed discourse analyses of legal and market processes and from
which much of this article is derived, I have described this regime in terms of
the ‘risk model’. Typical features of the risk model are: (a) a liberal political
consensus on the legitimacy of gambling as commercial entertainment; (b)
acknowledgement of the economical importance of the gambling sector; (c)
control of gambling markets, primarily to confront the risks of addiction and
crime.
Gambling in the risk model remains subordinate to the law. The liberalisation
and expansion of gambling markets did not change this. Liberalisation brought
new worries and controversies, such as gambling addiction. Therefore govern-
ment intervention on gambling increased and became more diverse. The pitch
shifted from regulations that are imposed externally and in advance, to internal
regulations that are subsequently supervised by the government. Thus policy
becomes indirect, as the government focuses less on the organisation of gam-
bling and more on the consequences of exploitation. These consequences, both
positive and negative, became far-reaching as the gambling sector expanded and
broadened. Positive consequences were the reinforcement of entertainment and
economic effects, such as revenue and employment opportunities. Negative
consequences concerned the shift in focus from the restriction of legal gambling
markets to the juridical struggle against illegal parallel markets, addiction and
crime among gamblers.
This risk model is closely linked to Beck’s risk society, but this regime of
regulation is as much a condition for the liberalisation of gambling as it is an
effect of it. The growth of gambling can lead to risk assessments, but risk
assessments can also give rise to liberalisation. The risk model does not simply
apply to gambling operations; rather, these markets are confronted with it
because of their own development. The rise of the risk model is part of a
‘paradigm shift’ (Kuhn, 1970) in regulation, leaving behind a former regulation
model, which I have called the ‘alibi model’, that underlies the Gambling Act of
1964. In that model, gambling is still intrinsically controversial. Gambling can be
legalised to avoid illegal markets; the exploitation of gambling was severely
restricted by discouraging the private pursuit of profit; and gambling revenues
were allocated to social interests, in terms of welfare, sports and other ‘just
causes’. With restrictive policies and the central role of the government in
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organising gambling markets, the alibi model closely concurs with the principles
of the welfare state.
During the 1980s the Dutch Government tried to retain the principles of the
Dutch Gambling Act of 1964. However, in a gradual process of many small but
significant adjustments to market developments a considerable reformation of
gambling policies unmistakably took shape. The alibi model shifted towards a
risk model. Now, there is hardly any (political) objection against gambling for
entertainment. Controlling ‘external effects’ has become the dominant strategy of
regulation, instead of restrictions or prohibitions. Fine-tuning gambling policies
to address the consequences of exploitation makes these policies more flexible.
The first signs of the risk model could be perceived in the Netherlands at the
end of the 1980s, with a wave of gambling expansion and the ascent of problem
gambling or gambling addiction. However, there is no clearly marked transition.
The risk model arose in reaction to the alibi model and this reaction has lead to
confusion, transitional periods and hybrid policies. This transitional phase and
the paradigm shift in gambling regulations came to the fore in a ‘legitimation
crisis’ of gambling policies. According to Habermas (1973), a ‘rationalisation
crisis’ in capitalist societies points to a situation where politics fails to connect
with or meet the demands of the market—a crisis that most likely underlies the
legalisation of gambling within the context of the alibi model. A ‘legitimation
crisis’ refers to a situation in which politics are giving in to market demands
without convincing and conclusive (legal) legitimations.
Liberalisation of Gambling
I will firstly discuss the internal regulation and the rise of the risk model on the
markets of slot machines, casinos and lotteries. Although recognition of the risk
of addiction is closely related to the expansion of these particular gambling
markets, this recognition took various trajectories in the Netherlands. The risk
model first appeared with the introduction of slot machines, because of their
perceived association with psychological addiction. Expansion of the casino
market also led to similar reforms. Subsequently, the legislator applied the risk
model to totes and lotteries, only because of the intended expansion of these
markets with the hybrid games of Lucky Ten and scratch cards. The path of
these trajectories highlights the logic of the risk model of regulation. With all of
these forms of gambling the operators strive for a market approach, higher
returns and the reinforcement of expressive modes of gambling. They do this not
only by revamping and stylising the gambling product, but also by preventing
and eliminating signs of addiction.
Slot Machines
In the Netherlands the private operation of slot machines was legalised in 1986.
This legalisation furthered the growth and professionalisation of the slot ma-
chine business. The ‘VAN-Gaming Machines Trade Organisation’ (the collective
interest organisation of slot machine entrepreneurs, originally founded in 1971)
operates as the nerve centre of the legal slot machine business. An organisation
like the VAN is of particular importance for the internal regulation of the
market.
The initial years after the legalisation of slot machines in the Netherlands are
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Gambling and the Risk Society 51
known as ‘the golden years’ among slot machine entrepreneurs. When the trade
peaked in 1990, a survey showed an average yield of 16,000 guilders per
machine, indicating a total profit of 1.48 billion, and tax proceeds up to 260
million guilders.3 However, in the early 1990s, prospects darkened as a result of
the public commotion around gambling addiction.
In the slot machine trade, the social concerns around gambling addiction led to
the introduction of the risk model of regulation. The VAN acknowledged the risks
of gambling addiction, partly from informed self-interest, and partly as a gesture
of socially responsible entrepreneurship. According to the VAN, the joining
members should not only distinguish themselves from non-member or mala fide
entrepreneurs by keeping to the Gambling Act, but also by maintaining a high
moral standard. However, the VAN was aware of ‘at times, a (too) poor under-
standing of social responsibility and a careless management of current
regulations’4 by members. Only recently has there been an active stance by the slot
machines trade against gambling addiction. For that matter, this is also true for the
gambling market in general and for government policy.
In 1993 a national about-face dominated political attitudes regarding slot
machines. This reaction was triggered by a ‘moral panic’ about gambling
addiction. The exploitation of gambling machines in cafeterias easily accessible
to young people, became particularly controversial (Kingma, 1997). The VAN
(re)defined allegations of social harm caused by slot machines into an economic
risk for the slot machine market, and ascribed a more active role to self-
regulation. Among other things, the VAN developed a new code of conduct for
the operation of slot machines (Smit, 1995).
With rising commercial competition from outside the organisation, discord
about the self-regulation initiatives inside the VAN increased. Entrepreneurs of
amusement arcades started to distinguish themselves from operators of slot
machines in pubs, cafe´s, restaurants and cafeterias.5 They wished to ensure the
market position of amusement arcades and guard it from the threatening
development in other venues. In the late 1980s all market leaders of amusement
arcades upgraded their establishments to distance themselves from the image of
dark and dirty gambling dens. The upgrading of amusement arcades is one of
the positive expressions of the risk model. At first the emphasis was on outward
appearances, then the emphasis shifted to the less visible aspects of the arcades,
such as the management, technology and knowledge skills of the staff. A next
step forward was to introduce the brand ‘Amusino’, to establish closer affiliation
with the professional and respectable image of Holland Casino.
Holland Casino
The risk model of regulation was triggered further by the expansion and growth
of the Dutch state monopoly on casinos rather than by allegations of gambling
addiction. In this respect the trajectory towards the risk model differs from the
slot machines market. Growth of a potentially hazardous product and proper
attention for addiction are, however, two sides of the same coin.
The Dutch decision in 1983 to expand the number of casinos from three to
eight was strongly influenced by the argument to control the illegal parallel
market. This primary argument of illegality, was directed in particular toward
the so-called ‘Golden Ten casinos’ which evaded the law by claiming to
exploit games of ‘skill’ instead of games of ‘chance’ (Kingma, 2004). There were
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secondary arguments: the argument that casinos would contribute to tourism
growth, which used to be a primary objective; employment, that is, each casino
would generate an estimate of 150 to 200 jobs; and the casinos’ economic
contribution in the long run.6 The third argument of economical benefit became
a primary argument in the most recent phase of development. During the 1980s
the key argument was to push back illegality by creating a legal alternative. This
regulating motive is characteristic for the alibi model. It hovers somewhere
between legal recognition and economic benefits. Previously, this motive had
already been a main issue for lotteries and totes.
By the early 1990s, twelve extensive and strictly regulated casino enterprises
operated under the brand name and uniform house style of Holland Casino. In
addition, more extravert and market-oriented innovations were proposed.7 In
these circumstances the risk model appeared. Under this model economic
returns are the priority, there is a pragmatic weighing of assets and liabilities,
and gambling addiction is the main justification to restrict development. Hol-
land Casino perceived and (re)defined the risk of addiction as a cultural risk that
could possibly damage Holland Casino’s vulnerable public image.
The emphasis in the Dutch casino business shifted from the establishment and
expansion of legal casinos, with a strong orientation on the Gambling Act, to an
efficient organisation and the gambling market. This is a shift of quantity and
gambling products to quality and consumer interests. The new guiding focal
points of Holland Casino are architecture, productivity, staff management,
internationalisation, product differentiation, commercial advertisement and
gambling addiction.8 These issues reflect the industry’s eye on the future, on the
quality of the casinos and on the market. To legitimate expansion, Holland
Casino moved away from the argument of illegality to promote casinos as one
of many facilities in the entertainment economy. Illegal casinos were to be
tackled directly by the Public Prosecutor.
This shift in legitimation became notably visible in the choice of locations for
the new casinos, which were built in or near urban entertainment districts. Thus,
in the phase of liberalisation the casino again became linked to a tourist
recreational environment. However, the Dutch casino is no longer seen as a
tourist attraction to make the area flourish, like the earlier casinos of Baden-
Baden or Monaco. The Dutch legislator referred to this classical European
casino concept at the time of legalisation in 1974. With the new casinos, the
relationship with the environment is reversed; the environment is treated as the
fertile source of day trippers and tourists. Aside from the gambling public,
Holland Casino is now also aiming for party-seekers, expanding the business
concept with entertainment and catering. The style of Holland Casino is now
best typified as a hybrid of the traditional European casino and the postmodern
American casino.
All these innovations were part of an ambitious but also ambiguous strategy.
They not only served to create a stylish environment but also to increase the
economic turnover rate and returns. As time passed, an important shift occurred
from French roulette to American roulette and particularly to the exploitation of
slot machines. In 1985 roulette generated 84% of casino revenue; in 1995 this had
dropped to 41%. By then, slot machines accounted for 33% of the revenue; now
Holland Casino was seriously competing with the private amusement arcades
for slot market share. Between 1985 and 2000 the gross profit of Holland Casino
rose from 142 million to 1.1 billion guilders per year.
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Gambling and the Risk Society 53
During this period of expansion, Holland Casino’s attitude towards politics
was ambiguous. On the one hand, Holland Casino felt restricted by the legal
regulations and inspections. Therefore, the company was looking for ways to
extend boundaries and broaden freedom of trade. The management invariably
accounted for these initiatives by referring to market pressures.9 On the other
hand, Holland Casino sought the protection of legal sanctuary when necessary.
This was especially clear in the mid-1980s when Holland Casino was resisting
the threat from the Golden Ten casinos (Kingma, 2004). Legal protection was
also sought when, in 1991, the European Committee considered breaking
through government monopolies of gambling markets under the rationale of
European market integration (Kingma and Beckers, 1991).
Nonetheless, there has been a slow but unmistakable movement towards the
liberalisation of the Dutch casinos. The dissolution of the Casinos Council in
1996 supports this claim. This council was replaced by a general board of
inspection on gambling, but this board does not supervise the operations of
Holland Casino. Supervision of casino management and strategies rests with
institutions at the other end of the money flow, the Ministries of Economic
Affairs and Finance. However, this supervision is mainly concerned with the
external effects of the casinos; the internal management and the responsibility
for gamblers is exclusively in the hands of Holland Casino itself.
The Instant Lottery
The risk model also influenced into the lottery market, even before this market
expanded or there were signs of gambling addiction. Here, the risk model
appeared in 1993, when the Dutch Sports tote (SNS) initiated an instant lottery,
also known as the scratch card lottery. In this case the risk of addiction was
(re)defined in terms of a political risk for government and parliament, who
might be held responsible for introducing a potentially dangerous gambling
product.
As any decrease in the sports tote’s turnover entails financial insecurity for the
sports sector in 1983, the Lower House required an evaluation of the Sports tote.
This evaluation eventually led to a bill with room for ‘product innovations’ and
a ‘restructuring of sales’. The government admitted that this reform was a
‘considerable liberalisation’. The legislator abolished the restriction on maximum
prizes (then half a million guilders) and the Sports tote was allowed to introduce
a jackpot and organise 370 lottery draws instead of 60 each year. Also, the
legislator simplified the Sports tote organisation. The sales monopoly of the
sports associations was broken and an on-line connection between the central
office and the sales outlets was allowed. The most striking innovation was the
lottery game Lucky Ten, set up in 1993 based on an American example. This
game has a daily draw. The Sports tote was also exploring the option of an
instant lottery, like the one that had been running in Belgium since 1981. Despite
the State Lottery’s plans, the government decided to grant the rights of an
instant lottery to the Sports tote, to be operated by the Netherlands Instant
Lottery (NIL) from 1990 onwards.10
The risk model was already evident at the Sports tote through its expansion
plans. Although the government still framed these legislative reforms in terms
of the Gambling Act of 1964, and still applied the alibi model—in this case the
allocation of the profits among collective charities in order to limit the supply
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of lotteries and the expansion of legal opportunities so as to eliminate illegal
operations—the actual motives were obviously at odds with that. In time, this
became clearer. The Council of State, for instance, was quick to remark that ‘the
creation of a more solid base to finance the sports sector as well as the sectors
of culture, social welfare and national health ‘can not be considered an elabor-
ation of the “channelling motive” of the Gambling Act of 1964’.11 Also, the
Council of State mentioned that the government should explicitly explain why
the expansion was justified in view of the ‘growing problem of the phenomenon
of gambling addiction’. The government stated in response that expansion ‘does
not entail risks for problematic gambling’.12 Lotto and tote were believed to be
dissimilar to casino games and slot machines. Because of the potential risks,
however, the government did consent to an evaluation of the instant lottery, two
years after its introduction.
In the same way that Lucky Ten was justified by traditional gambling policy
arguments by the government, so was the instant lottery.13 Yet, here again, the
direct and only motive was economic. With regard to scratch cards the govern-
ment ruled out excessive gambling. The government did acknowledge, however,
that the instant lottery has certain parallels with ‘short odds games’ and can be
categorised under ‘high-risk’ games. With the instant lottery, the Lower House
brought political criticism on the expansion of gambling markets to a head. The
major criticisms were that scratch cards were high-risk games, that the Sports
tote had already been expanded with Lucky Ten and that social unrest about
gambling addiction was increasing.
It is of considerable importance that the Lower House in 1992 explicitly
acknowledged the risks of addiction with the instant lottery. In the following
year, the moral panic about addiction related to slot machines was peaking. The
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports and the Netherlands Instant Lottery were
therefore very much in favour of thorough research, as promised to the House
of Commons by the State Secretary of Justice, to produce ‘a consistent analysis
of the problematic of gambling addiction’.14 Empirical research is essential for
the risk model, as there has to be a comparative assessment of the pros and cons,
often making policies dependent on periodic evaluations and ‘impact-measure-
ments’.
While the Lower House was still debating the question of whether gambling
addiction was a relevant concern with regard to the instant lottery, the Upper
House also considered this issue. In the main, the debate was about two
reports made under the orders of the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and
Sports and the Netherlands Instant Lottery: a report on the views and experi-
ences of foreign operators and welfare workers on instant lotteries in Belgium,
Germany and Denmark (IPM, 1993); and Risk-analysis Gambling (Kingma, 1993),
a report of a large-scale investigation into gambling and addiction in the
Netherlands.
The risk model, applied to the sports tote and the instant lottery by the
legislator, closely concurs with that of casinos and slot machines. As in those
cases, the decisive factor when it came to market expansion was economical.
And here too, legislators refused to take gambling addiction seriously until it
expanded to be a major social concern in the beginning of the 1990s. However,
it is remarkable that legislators considered gambling addiction to be a risk
with the sports tote and the instant lottery, even before Lucky Ten and scratch
cards appeared on the market. In other words, this early focus on gambling
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addiction with lotteries seems to be triggered by the regime of regulation that
had been played out for slot machines and casinos in the same period.
At the beginning of the 1990s a regime of regulation that seemed to be closer
to market principles more than the ideal of the Gambling Act of 1964, was defined
in the Netherlands. In the new risk model, two gambling categories approxi-
mated each other: the active and the passive. On one side, we find Lucky Ten
and the instant lottery. They are the exception to the general view of low-risk
lotteries. On the other side, we find controls applied to slot machines and casinos
due to the risks of addiction. These paths are complementary. With the instant
lottery the minimum criterion of the risk model is at issue: is there any chance
of addiction? With casinos and slot machines it is the maximum: to what extent
is addiction acceptable?
The Legitimation Crisis
As always in the long history of Dutch gambling practices, legislation lagged
behind the gambling market (Kingma, 1996). In the late 1980s this led to a
legitimation crisis (Habermas, 1973), a situation in which politics gave in to
market demands without convincing and conclusive (legal) justification. This
legitimation crisis, affecting the nature of gambling policy, applied to innova-
tions in virtually the entire range of gambling, not only on the markets discussed
above, namely slot machines, casinos and the sports tote. The agreement of the
Dutch trotting and racing association (STDR) with the British multinational
Ladbroke of 1986 on the operation of the Horse-racing tote through betting
shops, among other places, also seems to be contradicting the Gambling Act of
1964. Likewise, the formation of the National Postcode Lottery (NPL) in 1989
and the denationalisation of the State Lottery (SENS) in 1992 appear inconsistent
with the rationale of the Gambling Act.
With the rise of the risk model, gambling games became highly dependent on
the economy. This entails dependency on a mass public, competition, an
increasing use of mass media, ubiquitous gambling facilities, the danger of
addiction and a growing significance of (scientific) research. This complex of
dependencies undermined the rationale of the Gambling Act of 1964. The Gam-
bling Act’s assumed market situation changed its objectives: (a) the scarcity of
gambling was replaced by abundance; (b) the allocation of profits shifted from
being a means to achieve welfare goals to become the main purpose of gambling
policy; and (c) the regulation of gambling was no longer guided by the intrinsic
meaning of gambling to the gamblers—gambling or entertainment—but by the
extrinsic consequences—entertainment or addiction? These three trends as well
as the undermining consequences for the alibi model of the Gambling Act, will
be discussed in the following section. These tendencies led to confusion and
created a legitimation crisis for Dutch gambling policy.
Market Abundance
The Gambling Act of 1964 was originally based on a limited supply of gambling
facilities. This implicates an artificial scarcity on gambling markets. Gamblers
rejoiced about every gambling establishment that emerged; suppliers had a
monopoly. At the same time, this artificial scarcity paved the way for an
illegal supply. This in turn triggered a self-legitimating mechanism: the legislator
justified the legalisation and liberalisation of gambling with reference to
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the parallel illegal market. In fact, this politics of scarcity did not so much
provide a limited supply, as it caused a slackening of market expansion. As the
legislator gradually closed the gap between supply and demand, illegality lost
its validity as an argument for expansion.
Through the expansion of gambling markets, gamblers could be more discern-
ing and decide whether, and to what extent, they wanted to participate in
gambling. In this process the industry monopolies were broken. Gambling
providers had to deal with serious competition as well as with customers
that needed to be won over by their games. Market abundance made new
demands on the gamblers as well as on the providers. They were expected to
assume a different attitude than before, going from ‘always join’ to ‘conscious
choices’. The gambling operators shifted from ‘sit and collect’ to ‘active cam-
paigning’.
Competition between the providers of gambling games arose in the Nether-
lands on more than one front; for instance, between private slot machines and
Holland Casino as mentioned earlier in this article. On the lottery market we
find competition between the sports tote, the General Dutch Lottery (ALN), the
State Lottery and the Postcode Lottery. To a certain degree, these lotteries
traditionally operated on different, segregated segments of the gambling market.
They served different goals and used different distribution channels: sports
associations for the sports tote, banking for the General Dutch Lottery, individ-
ual collectors and kiosks for the State Lottery and television for the Postcode
Lottery. However, these market segments started to overlap as the Sports tote
expanded, the State Lottery was denationalised and the Postcode Lottery became
a new and highly commercialised provider on the lottery market.
The denationalisation of the State Lottery in 1992 was the greatest stimulant
for competition on the lottery market. It was part of a general trend towards
privatisation which the government also executed with, for example, the Dutch
postal services and public transport. This pursuit of privatisation interfered with
the gambling politics concerning the State Lottery.15 There, it enforced a hardly
recognised shift in objectives. From the start of the twentieth century, the State
Lottery had been primarily a means to regulate gambling markets as a kind of
‘safety valve’; it then became mainly a generator of income for the Ministry of
Finance with its prior interest being financial profit. This explains why the State
Lottery claimed the instant lottery and, like the Sports tote, implemented out a
corporate reorganisation and a market-oriented approach.
The establishment of the Postcode Lottery in 1989 intensified competition on
the lottery market. Also, the Postcode Lottery added a new category of private
welfare institutions, for human rights, third world and the environment, to the
established charities that share in the profits of gambling. Furthermore, the
Postcode Lottery used the sales channels of the mass media and was, in fact,
almost solely dependent on modern mass media. However, the Sports tote, the
General Dutch Lottery and the State Lottery were also increasingly making use
of mass media, following their shift towards a market-oriented approach.
The success of the Postcode Lottery can hardly be considered without the
impressive impact of television. The spectacular game shows express a kind of
virtual gambling community. The adding of show elements to lottery draws can
be compared with the architectural upgrading and innovation of amusement
arcades and casinos. The television personalities, and even more so the medium
itself, became key factors in its success. The Postcode Lottery’s success was also
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influenced by competition among charity institutions themselves. Another im-
portant factor was the liberalisation and commercialisation of the Dutch media
landscape, serving the development of the lottery formula. Between 1985 and
2000 the joint proceeds of the lotteries grew from 349 million to 1.35 billion
Dutch guilders per year. In 2000 the total turnover amounted to almost 3 billion
guilders and the lotteries contributed over 0.9 billion guilders to ‘just causes’.
The relative lack of competition in gambling markets up to the 1980s was
mirrored within the illegal parallel market. This phenomenon was not inherent
to gambling products per se but was closely linked to artificial scarcity in the
market within the context of the alibi model. Whereas the gambling politics of
the nineteenth century strived to prohibit the market, by the last decade of the
twentieth century the Dutch legislators were heading in the direction of a free
market. In between these two extremes, the alibi model of the Gambling Act of
1964 served a double purpose: it allowed a limited market.
From a long-term perspective it may seem that, with the new gambling
market of abundance, the Netherlands has returned to market conditions as
they were known before the nineteenth century, which thus could be regarded
as a historical accident. But this would be a misconception as in modernity we
have a great distinction between commercial development, legislation and the
consumption of gambling, all of which function as relative autonomous do-
mains in the field of gambling. In modern Dutch gambling regulations the
provision and operation of the games is constantly supervised by the govern-
ment, and restrictions on gambling serve only to organise the market and
protect the gamblers against themselves. The liberalisation of gambling signals
an inversion of the relation between state and market. In the early days, Dutch
governments would more or less leave the market to its own devices, until
gambling got out of hand; now, governments regulate the market to prevent
things from going wrong.
Returns
A market orientation and increasing competition both go together to make
economic returns the primary goal of Dutch gambling organisations. Charity
became more and more subsidiary a political means to legitimate as growing
revenues; for example, with the instant lottery, as we have seen, was devised to
mitigate the financial needs of the sports sector. It is not sport that underwrites
the lottery game, but lottery that supports sport. Social interests, which had been
the reason why lottery games were introduced, are more and more engaged to
serve the organisational interests of gambling.
Practical recognition that revenues are the main purpose of gambling policies
is clearly evident in the cases of casinos and slot machines. This is equally true
for totes and lotteries where we find a remarkable separation and inversion of
the relations between the two parties: the gambling enterprise and the ‘charities’
or ‘beneficiaries’.
In 1986 the Dutch Trotting and Racing Association came to an agreement with
the British multinational Ladbrokes to exploit the horse-racing tote in the
Netherlands. The agreement was clearly at odds with the rationale of the Dutch
Gambling Act as it allowed private corporations to gain profit from gambling
games. Also, the admission of betting shops greatly increased opportunities to
gamble outside the racetracks. This concession served solely to save the destitute
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trotting and racing association. Where the horse-racing tote (legalised in 1948)
originally aimed to meet the existing (illegal) demand for betting, in 1986
liberalisation was designed to arouse more interest in betting and to boost the
revenues.16
A similar purpose shift took place in the lottery branch. As previously
mentioned with regard to the State Lottery, denationalisation undermined the
traditional function of the State Lottery as a means to regulate the lottery market.
Also, with the expansion of the sports tote, the Instant Lottery and the Postcode
Lottery, gambling profits have been undoubtedly the main motive. Liberalisa-
tion and the increase in the proceeds for welfare and cultural charities were not
direct consequences of market demands for gambling, in any of these cases.
More likely, the demand for gambling was stimulated to increase the proceeds
for charitable purposes. Charities that previously were situated in the back-
ground as beneficiaries are more and more used as a prominent marketing
instrument for gambling, as are the prizes, the presentation and the distribution
channels. The beneficiary has become a ‘shareholder’ linking a noble cause to the
lottery. The Postcode Lottery interlaces the charities with the entire organisation
and presentation of the lottery. The reshaping of a charity into a marketing
instrument may reveal yet another process: reinforcement of the expressive
significance of lotteries, in terms of how much the participants are persuaded by
the charity as an expression of their identity as benefactor, and how much by the
actual needs of the less fortunate.
The question that rises around separation of the shareholding beneficiaries
and the gambling enterprises is no longer a question of finding a suitable
destination for revenues but the issue of deciding who, more than others, is
entitled to the gambling profits. It is this matter—the unequal treatment of
various charities and beneficiaries—that was the basis of the founding of the
Postcode Lottery. The direct link between gambling and charity, accomplished
within the context of the alibi model of regulation, led to a situation where
existing welfare organisations had the power to prevent the entry of new
charities, and, at the same time, where recognition of new charities automati-
cally called for a new lottery, as was the case with the Postcode Lottery.
However, and this is my main point, a rejection of new charities can only be a
problem if (implicitly) the revenues and not gambling policy is the point of
departure. Under the Gambling Act it was only relevant to know whether a
beneficiary was legitimate, not what organisations and good causes in the
Netherlands required financial assistance. Idealistic motives increasingly func-
tion to serve the interest of the lotteries. These motives serve less to justify
lotteries and more to attract participants and to distinguish one lottery from
another.
From a long-term perspective, the same that was said about the abundant
market conditions that currently prevail can be said for the primacy of revenues:
it may seem like Dutch gambling policy is returning to the pre-modern situation.
After all, in those days profits were the heart of gambling development—for
instance, the initiation of the State Lottery in the eighteenth century. However,
this interpretation would be a misconception, for the link between the game and
the destination of revenues is reversed. In the liberalisation process the emphasis
shifted from good causes to the gambling game. In the pre-modern phase,
charity served mainly to justify the lottery. In the recent phase of liberalisation
this regulating function of charity has become less important for the lotteries,
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Table 1. Social features of various types of gambling in the Netherlands, 1993
Population participation
3.5% 7.0%Age 12–75 47.3% 1.8%
Bingo (n  80)N  7840 CasinoLotteries Slot machines
(n  3413) (n  274)(n  111)
Women 28%51% 47%71%
Age 40  32%52% 15%52%
Class C/D 45%45% 32%65%
15%Motive money 33%67% 19%
Addiction 0.06% 1.3%2.5% 3.8%
C and D social classes are derived from education and professional status.
Superior to social classes C and D are the classes A, B1 and B2.
Motives reported less often than ‘money’ were ‘fun of playing’, ‘socialising’ and ‘distraction’.
Source: S. Kingma (1993) Risk-analysis Gambling. Research into the Nature and Prevalence of Gambling
Addiction in the Netherlands. Tilburg University.
while the financial objectives of the good causes and charities have increased in
importance in terms of the ‘external effects’ of lotteries. Thus, at first the lottery
was primarily dependent on the good cause and then, gradually, the good cause
became increasingly dependent on the lottery.
Gamblers
The shift in focus from the political meaning of gambling games to the conse-
quences for the gamblers, together with market abundance and the primacy of
the returns, undermined the rationale of the Gambling Act of 1964. In the
Gambling Act, the gambler’s interest is second to arguments concerning the
(supposed) intrinsic motivation and (illegal) exploitation of the game. In the
Gambling Act the gambler is only present in the shape of an assumed—and
sometimes deplored—‘demand’ or ‘need’ for gambling, usually referred to as
‘the human propensity to gamble’. Moreover, legislators tended conveniently to
associate specific games with an abstract and uniform public; for example
betting for sports lovers, casinos for elite tourists, bingo for working-class
housewives, slot machines for grown men, pin-tables for youngsters and the
State Lottery for the average citizen. Such over-simplified assumptions did not
stem from ignorance or indifference but from the fact that gamblers were simply
not that relevant to the Gambling Act. This changed with the liberalisation and
expansion of gambling markets and with growing concerns about gambling
addiction. It is now of political interest to know more about the gamblers and
their behaviour, and to ask who are susceptible to gambling addiction, to what
games and to what extent.
Research, in particular the 1993 national survey showed that the main
categories of gambling can be clearly distinguished if measured in terms of
consumer characteristics on a generalised level (Table 1).17 Relatively young
men dominate the slot machine market, lower-class women play bingo,
higher educated people are more likely to visit casinos and the lotteries,
which are most popular of all and where money is the major motive, display
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the image of a cross-section of the Dutch population. Addiction to gambling is
clearly linked to high-risk and expressive games; slot machines most of all.
Please note that Table 1 displays relative differences and no absolute correla-
tions between categories of gamblers and games. For example, the money
motive may be reported for any game; and women do participate in all forms
of gambling. The table only indicates that with these particular games there is a
clear dominance of particular social qualities of the gamblers. It is likely that,
since the 1960s, the gap between different forms of gambling has narrowed and
gamblers have become more heterogeneous. In this respect it is noticeable that
the social composition of bingo players is relatively homogeneous while the
composition of the casino gamblers, with its higher level of commercialisation,
is relatively heterogeneous.18 Nonetheless, as the market expands, competition
has increased within and between the categories. Also, entrepreneurs aim for a
broader audience by adding more generalised stylistic features and variations to
the games. The gamblers benefit from this individual orientation and have a
wider range of choice.
The innovation of an unambiguous relation between a type of game and a
particular social category or, in other words, the shaping of a mass public for
gambling, and the political acknowledgement thereof, raises a new question.
The political issue is no longer how to meet the implicit and natural demand
for gambling; the questions become: what game will supply particular needs;
how great is the demand and where does it stem from? These questions are
just as hard to answer as the former question about the allocation of the
revenues, based on the Gambling Act. To answer them we need to gain more
insight into the lifestyles of social groups, a matter more for income or welfare
policy than it is for gambling policy. The unequal treatment of social groups
is clearly evident in the case of the slot machines. Association between these
machines and young people in cafeterias, together with repudiation of gam-
bling for young people, because of the danger of addiction, has led to the
removal of slot machines from cafeterias. A game that was previously permit-
ted by the legislator, was now withdrawn on the grounds of potential risks to
a particular social group. However, and this reversal is what interests us,
addiction only gets to be a problem for policy makers if the regulation of
demand, not the supply, comes first. The point is that Dutch slot machine
policy has partly come to depend on demand and this does not fully comply
with the rationale of the Gambling Act.
As with the abundant commercial market and charitable gambling, viewed
from a long-term perspective, it would be a misconception to conclude that the
shift in emphasis from game supply to game demand implies a backlash. On the
contrary, in the early days, for instance with regard to the nineteenth-century
criticism on the State Lottery, it was all about minimal legal concessions to an
undesirable practice; now, the issue is to extract maximum revenues from the
legitimate demand for gambling. The link between the game and the need to
play has been reversed. In pre-modern times the game was meant to meet this
need; thus the game was dependent on the gambler. Now, the game defines the
needs that the gambler can satisfy, making the gambler dependent on gambling
facilities.
Preoccupation with the effects of gambling in the risk model of regulation
does not, as was mentioned before, focus solely on the risks of addiction but also
on the competition between the game organisers as well as on their profits. All
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these effects require more and more objectifying research. This applies as much
to entrepreneurs as it does to policy makers. Even gamblers can benefit by
learning from consumer organisations what games are the most attractive or the
least risky. The objective knowledge of gambling games has increased. This
scientification can be understood as a condition for and a sign of gambling market
liberalisation and the risk model of gambling regulation. One thing this entails
is that the political and professional debates on gambling are more and more
pursued in the context of research reports, thus ruling out of the debate anyone
who is not properly informed about these reports.
Flexible Policies
The three tendencies of market expansion, the primacy of revenues and the
problem of demand for gambling, have undermined the Gambling Act of 1964.
Over a considerable period of time politicians or gambling operators have partly
or totally refused to acknowledge this consequence. They keep to the alibi
rhetoric of the Gambling Act for the sake of established providers, for the lack
of an alternative frame of interpretation and also as a result of low levels of
public interest and expertise. However, their arguments have become less and
less convincing. More parties have been expressing their doubts about the
principles of the Gambling Act. This is why I do not speak merely of differences
of opinions about the Dutch gambling policy but of a legitimation crisis of this
policy, as the influence of the Gambling Act on the market is weakened. In a way,
people were confronted with the risk model while they were still thinking in
terms of the alibi model.
The legitimation crisis took shape in the 1980s during resolutions about the
liberalisation of gambling markets. The legislator was determined, and without
much ceremony and by common consent, applied the alibi model of regulation
without public debate. Questions did not arise until the consequences of liber-
alised markets started to show in the form of growing revenues, increasing
competition, new and flashy gambling establishments, sensational advertising
and reports on gambling addiction. At first it was not the responsible depart-
ments, the government or parliament who expressed doubts, but the (duped)
stakeholders: local governments that were dealing with slot machine addiction;
the addiction treatment centres or the Casinos Council. The Casinos Council,
supervising Holland Casino operators, moved into the policy void and offered
the government advice (Casinos Council, 1988). The immediate impetus for this
advice was the unequal treatment of different categories of gambling games, the
tolerance of Golden Ten casinos and the risks of gambling addiction. A political
evaluation of the gambling policy was only realised when the Dutch govern-
ment formulated a response to the advice of the Casinos Council in the policy
statement Games of Chance in Perspective (Dutch Government, 1988–89).
However, with this attempt to adjust and justify the existing policy, the
government came closer to making the legitimation crisis explicit than to
resolving it. As both the Casinos Council and the government did not consider
the anomalies to be undermining the Gambling Act; rather they interpreted these
consequences as the result of an inadequate execution and maintenance of the
law. The Casinos Council defined the market situation mostly as the result of
neglect and a maintenance crisis. According to the government, the principles of
the Gambling Act of 1964 were still paramount. The government was
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imprudent when it referred to the ‘two-track policy’ mentioned by the Casinos
Council, that speaks of reticence with regard to gambling addiction, on the one
hand, and a reinforcement of market powers with regard to fighting illegality,
on the other, as merely ‘seemingly contradictory’.
As described earlier, Dutch politics was committed to the gambling policy in
1992 and 1993, in particular to the slot machines and the expansion of the sports
tote and the Instant Lottery. The parliament, which expressly took on the
gambling policy, proclaimed gambling addiction to be the central issue. Mean-
while, within government departments civil servants were developing initiatives
to sharpen the gambling policy. The most radical measure that the government
proposed was to ban slot machines from cafeterias in 1995.
As in the earlier policy report Games of Chance in Perspective (Dutch Government,
1988–89) the government subscribed to the principles of the Gambling Act of 1964
in a further report Games of Chance Revisited (Ministry of Justice, 1995), indicating
that they wished to return to the ‘original principles’ of the law. However, the
arguments directly contradicted this objective. The proposed measures came
down to a limitation on supply of gambling opportunities to reduce the risk of
addiction, a policy which contradicts the original principle of limited supply to
meet the demand for gambling. At the same time the government promised to
track and prosecute illegal games in the future, a policy which is at odds with the
original strategy of competing against illegal gambling.
The described legitimation crisis started from an internal undermining of the
legal gambling sector, which had called for prescriptive policy innovation. As a
consequence, the legitimacy of the Gambling Act is being questioned and the
upper limit of what is legally admissible is being stretched (as with the sports
tote) or scaled down (slot machines). As we have seen with regard to the totes
and lotteries, the Gambling Act was interpreted in a creative and liberal way, to
justify concessions for socially accepted commercialised gambling facilities. In
this way we find a considerable flexibility of interpretation at the top end of the
Gambling Act, such that it was no longer clear if gambling providers still
complied with the Gambling Act at all. With this policy flexibility came a
breakthrough within the legal order, which in the near future may well lead to
a modernisation of the Dutch Gambling Act.19
The Risk Society
In this article I have analysed the rise of the risk model of regulation on Dutch
gambling markets. In most cases the risk model went together with liberalisation
of the market and a flexible approach to gambling policies. This means not only
that gambling providers have more liberties but also that they themselves are
held responsible for the consequences of legal gambling, addiction being one of
the most significant of these consequences. It seems that with the growth of
gambling markets the risk of addiction increased as well. However, as I have
argued, it is just as accurate to hold that the Dutch gambling markets were
liberalised because they were considered to be less risky, measured by other
criteria, than in the past.
What insights can we gain from this analysis in terms of risk? In this
concluding section I would like to stress that the concept of the risk society
(Beck, 1992) offers a positive, although ambiguous, definition of an altered social
condition.
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With regard to gambling, I chose not to emphasise the abolition of prohibi-
tions and restrictions but the new controls that replaced the old strategies. These
controls, based on ‘external effects’ and ‘risk analysis’, are a reaction to and an
extension of earlier regulations. With the transformation of gambling policies
there is a continuation in the direction of the structural development of gam-
bling practices. This direction can be interpreted as the autonomisation, or
regularising and commercialising of gambling as entertainment, a change which
claims entertainment as a primary motive for gambling behaviour and an
expanding commercial gambling sector that has a growing share in and
influence on society at large (Kingma, 2002, p. 414). Gambling practices are
increasingly organised as an autonomous, self-steering and distinct economical
sector. The binding of gambling to the Dutch Gambling Act, which included
considerable restrictions on growth, smoothed the path for this development.
The subsequent policy of market liberalisation implicated an ongoing autonomi-
sation as the focus shifted from external regulation to internal regulation based
on risk assessments. The self-organising ability of the Dutch gambling sector
increased. Furthermore, in this process the gambling sector absorbed, as it were,
elements from the broader environment. That happened, on the one hand,
because other sections of society got involved with gambling, for instance
architecture, information technology, welfare or science. On the other hand, the
gambling sector increasingly had to deal with reactions to the influences of
gambling on the environment, for instance regarding the allocation of revenues
or harm caused by crime and addiction. Gambling networks are now entangled
with the broader society and this is one reason why I prefer to speak of a
gambling complex rather than of gambling markets.
In the Netherlands the risk model of regulation was triggered by the
consequences of legalising gambling markets. In the beginning the legislator
justified gambling liberalisation and anti-addiction policies with alibis and
rationales from the Gambling Act of 1964. However, these alibis were losing
credibility and often appeared to be inadequate when it came to controlling the
market. Market control became more of a problem as the legislator gradually
allowed free market mechanisms and competition to move into the entire
gambling sector. This stretching of policy led, as we have seen, to a legitimation
crisis. The government followed the logic of market development, adjusted its
gambling policy and in the process undermined the rationale of the Gambling
Act.
The background, as outlined in this article was a process of autonomisation
that reversed relations between gambling on the one hand and on the other the
government, the social-economic interests associated with gambling or the
gamblers. In contrast to the pre-modern gambling markets, gambling is now
subject to the law, social-economic interests depend on the lottery and the
gambler needs to find satisfaction in the games that are on offer. Thus, it would
be incorrect to conclude that with recent liberalisation gambling practices enjoy
a similar freedom to what they had in pre-modern times.
The idea of (relatively) autonomous processes is also central to Beck’s theses
on the risk society. He suggests that the autonomous development of science
and technology in particular has taken on such forms that modern industrial
societies are confronted with radical unforeseen consequences, such as en-
vironmental and health issues, which are not safeguarded by protective
measures, like those of the welfare state. Beck has coined a term—‘reflexive
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modernisation’—to describe being confronted with these consequences, recog-
nising and anticipating them, reacting upon them and more or less accepting
the potential consequences as well as making organisations accountable (Beck,
1992; Beck et al., 1994). The term ‘reflexive’ refers not only to a more or less
direct reaction to the consequences of former decisions but also to ‘reflection’
in a sense of awareness. Ultimately, ‘self-critique’ will become a characteristic
of organisations in the risk society.
Risk in this context does not refer to actual harm or to the attempts to
remove danger, which is the object of risk; rather it is the reshaping of society
and organisations as a reaction to the possibility of (often unknown) dangers.
If risks are acknowledged this may change the condition of their existence
(Van Loon, 2002). According to the ‘actor-network theory’, developed by
Latour (1997) among others, the ‘diffusion’ of gambling and addiction goes
together with the ‘translation’ of gambling and addiction into the terms of
various parties that are involved in the gambling complex. They influence
gambling practice, causing the social meaning of gambling to gradually
change.
The introduction of the risk model requires a different mentality, a fresh way
of looking at gambling practices. It testifies to a creative act of all parties
involved. Gambling liberalisation runs parallel to reforms of gambling and a
shift in signification. To realise market growth, entrepreneurs have modernised
their gambling products using advanced technologies and variety. The new
architecture of arcades and casinos is eye-catching, as are the information
technology of betting shops and the sensational lottery game shows. Gambling
addiction is another new and hot item, which has become a central criterion of
the recent gambling policies, a criterion that involve economic, cultural and
political risks for gambling enterprises. The fresh relevance of gambling addic-
tion can, largely, be explained from the ‘invention’ of and political sensitivity to
gambling addiction itself. Signs of addiction in the Netherlands were present
before the 1990s but they were not acknowledged as such or thought to be
irrelevant (Kingma, 2002). In the early 1990s, Dutch policy makers and legisla-
tors linked almost every measure and gambling problem to addiction. However,
gambling addiction is not a well-defined and clearly recognisable ‘disease’, and
the risk is no given truth. On the contrary, gambling addiction is a very
controversial subject. It is virtually invisible; the symptoms do not show until
long after the behaviour has started or after the introduction of a new gambling
product, and it is a normative concept with many diverse and contradicting
definitions. Questions of causality (is the problem the game or the gambler?) or
responsibility remains unanswered and are subject to debate.
Gamblers Anonymous, psychologists, welfare institutions, the media, politi-
cians and gambling organisations all play a part in the social definitions of
gambling addiction. Science in particular has been crucial for the objectification
of gambling addiction and risk assessments in the Netherlands. In this way,
gambling addiction is made to be an inevitable reality.20 In this new social
condition of the risk society, gambling organisations have come to depend on
the scientific analyses of the external effects of their games. Gambling practices
have to be accounted for constantly in terms of possible consequences. This is
how governments and gambling enterprises legitimate their proposals for ex-
pansion (or curtailment) of the market.
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The dynamics of the risk model seem to reveal a paradoxical process. While
risk assessments serve to justify the liberalisation of gambling, liberalisations in
turn enhances the risks of gambling markets. This paradox indicates the ‘open
ended’ or ‘virtual’ character of risks, as Van Loon (2002) comprehensively
argues. Without cultural and political awareness there is no risk, because once
a danger leads to harm it ceases to be a risk. The point of recognising risk is to
avoid damage or harm.
On the other hand, without the actual occurrence of harm we will not easily
become aware of gambling dangers and risks. If there is no convincing or actual
proof of harm caused by gambling, politicians can decide to liberalise the market
even if dangers might be expected, and if risk assessments are required this can
lead to political restraint, even if there does not seem to be an actual danger.
Regarding the liberalisation of gambling in the Netherlands, my conclusion is
not that politics has incorrectly or randomly made use of risk assessments, but
that an interplay exists between the political and economical side of gambling
cultures that is part of and contributes to the risk society.
Notes
1. Umberto Eco (1991) in his comment on Huizinga’s game theory distinguishes the ‘active game’
(Ludere alea: the gamblers have something to play with and influence the course of the game)
and the ‘passive game’ (Alea iacta est: the gamblers can merely start the game and have no
power over the course of the game, as in a lottery). This distinction can also be made between
the role of the game structure (expressive) versus that of the result of the game (instrumental).
In gambling policy this crude distinction is also known as long odds versus short odds (the
difference between stake and profit), ‘slow’ versus ‘fast’ profit games (the time between
distribution of profit and next stake), ‘non-continuous’ versus ‘continuous’ gambling (the speed
of the wager–play–outcome sequence) or ‘low-risk’ versus ‘high-risk’ gambling (the odds of
addiction).
2. Joost van Loon (2002, p.15) criticises Beck’s thesis of the risk society on the grounds that this
macro-sociology is not particularly suited to understand the dynamics behind the logic of its
own thesis.
3. These figures are based on the financial statements of the entrepreneurs themselves. In 1996 tax
returns rose 25% on average, after a tightening of inspection by the tax authorities.
4. VAN, Op weg naar een branche die gezien mag worden. Beleidsplan van de Vereniging Automatenhan-
del Nederland voor de jaren negentig (VAN Policy Plan for the 1990s), Rosmalen, 1989.
5. VAN, Kwaliteit zaaien, Onderscheid oogsten. Strategie en beleid van de sectie Amusementscentra van
de VAN (VAN Policy Plan of the Amusement Arcades), 1996.
6. Casinos Council, Advies aan de Staatssecretarissen van Justitie en van Economische Zaken betreffende
uitbreiding van het aantal casinovestigingen van de Nationale Stichting tot Exploitatie van Casinospelen
in Nederland (advice concerning the expansion of casinos in the Netherlands), The Hague, 1983.
7. For the development of Holland Casino I have studied annual reports and business plans. In
addition I have used several of my own interviews with the management and staff of Holland
Casino in the period 1991–93.
8. Holland Casino, Integrale beleidsvisie van Holland Casino voor de jaren negentig (Policy Plans of
Holland Casino for the 1990s), Hoofddorp, 1990.
9. Interview with the CEO of Holland Casino: Gaming and Wagering Business, 1 June 1995.
10. However, included in the bill of 1991 is that the State Lottery receives 5% of the gross income
from the instant lottery to compensate.
11. Raad van State, ‘Advies wijziging van de Wet op de Kansspelen betreffende sportprijsvragen
en de lotto’, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1990–91, wet 22.172, B, 2 (Proceedings of Parliament). By
using the concept ‘channelling’, the legislators themselves refer to aspects of the alibi model.
12. ‘Memorie van toelichting. Wijziging van de Wet op de Kansspelen betreffende sportprijsvragen
en de lotto’, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1990–91, wet 22.172, no. 3, 9 (Proceedings of Parliament).
13. ‘Memorie van toelichting. Wijziging van de Wet op de Kansspelen betreffende sportprijsvragen
en de lotto’, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1990–91, wet 22.172 (Proceedings of Parliament).
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14. ‘Wetsvoorstel Wijziging van de Wet op de kansspelen in verband met het organiseren van de
instantloterij’, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1992–93, wet. 22.269, 1735/1737 (Proceedings of
Parliament).
15. A state committee proposed a merger to avoid competition, in particular with regard to the
instant lottery.
16. Ladbroke’s venture in the Netherlands was unsuccessful. According to the Dutch Trotting and
Racing Association, Ladbroke misjudged the Dutch betting market and invested too much.
According to Ladbroke, the Dutch Gambling Act, in particular the gambling tax, was detrimen-
tal for betting.
17. Kingma, S. 1993. Risk-analysis Gambling. Research into the Nature and Prevalence of Gambling
Addiction in the Netherlands, Tilburg University. This report contains the account of a written
questionnaire with 7840 respondents from the population from 12 to 75. Every person who
participated in at least one gambling game during the first nine months of 1993 is considered
a participant. Addiction was measured by asking the respondents about any possible gambling
addicts among their acquaintances.
18. Bingo is allowed only in informal settings with no commercial providers (Kingma 1998).
19. In 2000 a departmental study group proposed plans to further liberalise the Dutch gambling
market (MDW–wergroep kansspelen, 2000). These liberalisations have not been implemented
since government considered them too far-reaching.
20. In this respect gambling addiction has similar characters to other much discussed typical
dangers in the context of the risk society, such as our environment (climate changes or the
ozone layer) or health (HIV and AIDS, BSE and CJD) (Van Loon, 2002).
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